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My life amounts to no more than one drop in a limitless ocean. Yet what is any ocean but
a multitude of drops?
David Mitchell, Cloud Atlas

Ve,y often histOIJ' is a means of denying the past. Denying the past is to refuse to
recognise its integrity. To fit it, force it, function it, to suck out the spirit until it looks the
way you think it should. We are all historians in our small way.
Jeanette Winterson, Oranges are Not the Only F111it
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INTRODUCTION
Lee Edelman's No Future is brilliant for what it reveals about the limitations
reproductive futurity confers our imaginations for the future of queers and troubling for
what Edelman suggests we do about their precarity. No Future is a canonical text in the
futurity comer of queer theory, wherein Edelman identifies queerness as a refusal of the
future linked directly to the reproductive incapacity of same-sex couples. For Edelman,
queers' lack of future is an extension of the dominant social narrative that, thanks to
reproductive futurism, reduces queerness to same-sex object-choice. That narrative
renders queers strictly non-reproductive, and children only accomplishable through the
consummation of heterosexual pairings. Since queers cannot contribute life to the future
in the form of children, queerness and queer life become aligned instead with death.
This is a complex narrative that figures children as the stuff the future is made of,
and queer as a threat to both children and the symbolic Child. The stakes of this language
is high because such biopo1itical social narratives circularly facilitate queers' actual,
premature deaths. The quality of queer lives are shaped by how queer futures are
collectivity imagined, so it takes a co11ective reimagination to ensure queer survival.
Edelman may not exactly intend to ensure survivability with his theory, but it perhaps
inadvertently instigates an already present queer suicidality and necropolitics in the
process. Queers take their own lives at an a]anning rate, and particularly for queers of
color or who fail to convincingly pass as heterosexual or cisgender, their Jives are too
often taken from them. Children represent only one material contribution to the future,
and a queer survival that pushes against Edelman's notion of No Future may hinge on the
concession of non-material queer contributions to futurity.
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Edelman 's declaration of no future is not meant to be interpreted literally-after
all, anyone who has a present and a past has had a future of some kind. Having no future
stands in for queers having no stakes in tomorrow, at least symbolically, but as far as this
symbolism is rooted in reproductive capacity, it has some actual implications. He
suggests that queers revel in freedom from the tremendous responsibility of ensuring a
future through children instead of mourning the inevitable loss of their futures. Without
responsibility for the future, they are free to pursue pleasure in a way only those with no
future may. The symbolic future that depends on the symbol of the Child depends in turn
on imagining queer as risky, viral, immoral, and otherwise leading to premature death.
That imaginary extends from actual rhetoric and threats to queer lives, so there is a real
danger in the symbols that infonn the imaginary worlds that shape real social structures.
The insistence that there is no future embraced by Edelman is exactly what continually
denies queers their futures; it is self-fulfilling.
Edelman does not account for the more and more frequent occasions when queers
demonstrate that they can reproduce or otherwise parent. He also does not ponder what it
might mean for queers to claim responsibility for the future through parenthood by
whatever means, particularly amidst a neoliberal present when the parenthood of only
certain queers (white and wealthy with neoliberal commitments) is a political investment.

This is, in part, because Edelman's ability to theorize queer futurity is limited by the
social and technological world that includes this "dominant fantasy" wherein queers
simply cannot reproduce. This is, indeed, a fantasy meant to protect children from being
preyed on by queers, genetically inheriting queerness, and the symbol of the Child from
tarnishing. A world constructed to be hostile for queers inspires both their suicides and
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their murders, and I am afraid Edelman's title contention of no future taunts queers'
already precarious livelihoods. Articulated best by queer theorist Jose Esteban Munoz,
the ability to imagine not just a future, but a future that differs from an imperfect present
is critical for the survival of those whose futures are quite literally in peril.1 No Future
deals with dense symbolism, and Edelman is not always skilled at differentiating between
the symbolic and the actual, or articulating what they might mean for one another. What
goes unsaid is that the symbolic and the actual inform one another. Edelman's call to
reject the future, however symbolic, contributes to the actual denial of the imagination
Munoz identifies as crucial to survival.
In Undoing Gender, queer theorist Judith Butler argues that "theory is itself
transformative,"2 and I am working within a similar assumption that theory does not just
seek to arrive at truths or closer approximations of truth, but that it may additionally
intervene to reshape what is true, or even possible. Edelman's theory is so abstract, it can
be difficult to derive any meaning for our world from it, much less transform anything.
His revelation is that orientation toward death is simply a truth of the queer condition,
and since it is true, his intervention is only that we might as well embrace it for the
unique and individualistic privileges queer carries. This is far more complacent than it is

Jose Esteban Munoz, "Cruising the Toilet: LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka, Radical
Black Traditions, and Queer Futurity," in C111ising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer
Futurity, (New York: New York University Press, 2009). 94.
2

Judith Butler, "The Question of Social Transformation," in Undoing Gender

(New York: Routledge, 2004). 204.
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transformative, settling for the status quo that turns a blind eye or an intentional hand to
queer demise. lt reinforces the morbid and melancholic symbols queers are bound up
with. Symbols signify the social, so queers suffer actual consequences by extension of the
symbols affixed to what it means to be queer. Transformation requires locating the ways
queers shape and reshape the social and interpreting this effect on the social as futurebuilding-transform the symbolic to transform the actual.
ln consideration of queer social contributions to the future, I want to call on two
literary figures: Moll Cutpurse, antihero of Thomas Dekker and Thomas Middleton's The
Roaring Girl (1611), and Jess Goldberg, protagonist of Leslie Feinberg's Stone Butch

Blues (1993). A Renaissance crossdresser and a mid-century butch dyke, each of these
characters of near and distant pasts bear some undeniable familiarity, resembling versions
of queerness our society grapples to understand today, but nonetheless recognizes. Each
represent threads that meet at some node from which emerges what is understood today
as transgender. Moll was based on Mary Frith ( 1583- 1659), an infamous cross-dressing
pickpocket in London at the time The Roaring Girl was penned (1607- 1610). Frith was
very much alive at the time, and it is not out of the realm of possibility that she was an
audience member to an early performance. Jess is not pure fiction either, as far as she
appears to be rather autobiographical. Jess occupies a similar queer in-between as her
author, Leslie Feinberg (1949-2014), even coming of age in the same time and place as
Feinberg, the Buffalo-area of New York in the mid-twentieth century. They are far from
mythical creatures. ln retrospect, they are recognizable, which makes it easy to project
ourselves onto (or into) the past, but their own eras have little context for them beyond
their failure of norms. Insofar as children represent future, and the sinthomosexual, the
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death-driven queer figure Edelman deals with, can be interpreted as a suspended
childhood or Peter Pan syndrome, queer is future. Queer is not a site of limitation, but a
site of possibility. Queer escapes definition, but if it is nothing else, it is a deviation. As
Moll and Jess deviate from social norms, they also reshape what constitutes deviation,
making room for queerness to manifest in new, more visible, and more identitarian ways
in the future. The ways they stretch possibilities for embodiment and desire represent the
non-biological ways queers reproduce, thereby building queer futures.

QUEER TEMPORALITIES, QUEER HISTORIES

Mapping routes to queer futures requires a framework through which time and
transmission between temporal reference points should be understood for its purposes.
Different and rearranged reference points mark queer lives. Queers experience their
movement through time according to different tempos, and next to temporal norms, those
differences are accentuated. Elizabeth Freeman, a prolific author on queer temporalities,
sums up temporal norms as "chrononormativity." Freeman defines chrononormativity as
"the use of time to organize individual human bodies toward maximum productivity."3
Queer becomes implicated here because normative markers of life, particularly marriage
and children, are economically productive. Chrononormativity is very much at work in
reproductive futurism. It describes individual queer anachronism, but mostly accounts for

3

Elizabeth Freeman, "Introduction: Queer and Not Now," in Perverse Modernities:

Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories, (Durham: Duke University Press,

2010). 3.
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the present, while the past disappears into the background. For looking back in time,
historicism employs a linear model that splices time into enormously broad categories
like premodern, modern, and postmodern to describe ideologies that cannot possibly
emerge and disappear at such concrete and singular moments. Madhavi Menon, a scholar
of Renaissance English, offers an approach to history better suited to situate something as
ephemeral queerness in time. She names homohistory and heterohistory-ways of doing
history that are based on notions of either sameness or difference. Though the terms
themselves only refer to their prefixes meaning same (homo) and different (hetero),
homohistory is a queer temporality.
Heterohistory, the framework of historicism, marks the past and present as
categorically different, and the future will be similarly cordoned off in what Menon calls
"an absolute schism between past and present."4 Within this framework, it is difficult to
imagine how queer figures of the past-represented here by two literary figures-might
shape queer imaginaries today. Homohistory instead organizes time through an
acknowledgement that the present is a seamless continuation of the past. The framework
recognizes the melding of time and the long arm of the past that is constantly reaching
into the present to rearrange it (as we too reach into the past) and the futures we have yet
to arrive in. The project of heterohistory that touts progress suggests that, because the
present is the most advanced period in linear time, what we now collectively accept as
truths must be the closest to the truth we have ever been; our compounded learning must

4

Madhavi Menon, "Unhistoricism of Homohistory," in Unhistorical Shakespeare:

Queer Theo,y in Shakespearean Literature and Film, (New York: Petgrave, 2008). 3.
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accumulate in a progressive and improving manner. Homohistory rejects progress
claimed by heterohistory's linear time and credits the past with what it may know better
than the present and the possibility that we have surpassed truths, may return to them, or
have yet to arrive at them entirely. Questions of what futures we are building and what
pasts built this present are questions that simply cannot be raised in a heterohistorical
model. Further, the rigid categorical stability of historicism matches a rigidly categorized
conceptualization of queerness in a framework of identity that only appears endlessly
open to possibility. Such rigidity denies queerness its uncertainty, thereby denying it
amorphous transmission between past, present, and future.
The purpose of homohistory is not to imagine time without consecution and
chronology or to deny the order in which we experience the world unfolding. What
historicism and linear time fail to capture is a compounding nature, and while the clock
does not adequately demonstrate this, we do have other implements of time that better
approximate it: the hourglass. Imagine the top bulb is full of possibilities awaiting their
realization, and they fall into the bottom bulb as they are realized where they join other
possibilities made real. They fall in a certain order that is affected by the realization of
surrounding possibilities, but that some fell long ago does not render them obsolete. They
accumulate, reorganize, compound, and reshape as a result of their interaction with each
other. This is the relationship between the past and the future that Menon describes. It has
chronology, but it accumulates and compounds, intermingling with and changing the
meaning of everything that has unfolded before and will unfold later. Philosopher Walter
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Benjamin calls this "time filled by the presence of now."5 Benjamin sees a chronology
that forgets the past, is forward-moving, and progress-oriented as an oppressive tactic of
fascism. 6 It wipes our memories and presents us with a clean slate so it cannot be held
accountable for what it did in the past or what it will do about it in the future.
Homohistory holds accountability; heterohistory dodges it. In No Future, Edelman pulls
queerness from its context to freeze it in time, as if it touches nothing and is touched by
nothing. Stone Butch Blues begins in 1950s Buffalo, New York, and this time and place
involves implications about what it means to be queer that seem rudimentary within
heterohistory; it might figure Jess as some sort of proto-queer. But homohistorical
assumptions allow me to consider how queer pasts, presents, and futures are all bound up
in one another.

STONE BUTCH BLUES: A DISAPPEARING ACT
Stone Butch Blues follows its queer protagonist through several decades, making

it particularly useful for imagining the futures queers might create. Over the course of the
text, Jess Goldberg goes from butch dyke, to man, and back to butch dyke again, and this
arc helps to reveal a route to and from a version of queerness only recently recognizable
in our culture: transgender. Jess enacts a queerness that is not yet legible while she waits
on a future safe enough to visibly inhabit a butch body. Her enaction of an alternative

5

Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations, ed.

Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 261.
6

Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," 264.
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queerness makes way for a future where it will be legible and accommodated within our
language and imaginations to be transgender. Imagining transmasculinity as a fork that
splits off from butch lesbianism figures to it as a social reproduction, an alternative to
reproduction of children as the means to build a future. Further, the way anticipated
threats to Jess' life drive the ways she enacts her queerness during different periods of
time highlights just how precarious queer futures can be.
Queer theorist Judith/Jack Halberstam helps make sense of Jess' evolution
through an assertion that ..while it is true that transgender and transsexual men have been
wrongly folded into lesbian history, is it also true that the distinctions between some
transsexuals and lesbians may at times become quite blurry."7 Jess straddles an uncertain
line between butch lesbianism and transmasculinity, revealing rather unstable boundaries
drawn between the two. Transgender is generally understood as an umbrella term
describing any deviation of gender from biological sex, roughly encompassing anything
not cisgender. Such a generous definition places butch squarely beneath the umbrella,

figuring butch as trans-lesbianism. Figured this way, transgender, and specifically
transmasculinity, seems like far less of a leap from butch lesbianism. Though it may
eclipse her actual desires, Jess embodies a certain queerness of trans manhood that was
not quite legible. The illegibility of transness during Jess' moment in time is evident in
Feinberg's vocabulary (or void of) to describe it-the descriptor closest to transgender in

7

Judith Halberstam, "Transgender Butch: Butch/FTM Border Wars and the

Masculine Continuum," in GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies no. 2. 4. (1998):
293.
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the text is "he-she." As far as Jess resembles forms of queer that are familiar today, Jess
seems to counter Edelman's implication that a queer body may inhabit the world without
making contributions to future. What she contributes takes the form of social
reproduction, and she reproduces it through negation.
By proxy of her girlfriend Theresa, Jess drifts from bar culture and stumbles onto
the college campuses of the l 960s where women's lib and its Lavender Menace are
unfolding. She finds that her masculinity that was once desired at the bar is seen as
emblematic of patriarchy on campus, despite occupying a version of womanhood herself.
It is during this period of political upheaval that Jess begins to toy with the possibility of
passing as a man, confiding in Theresa, "I'm telling you, it's getting worse out there."8 I
choose the word "passing" carefully and specifically. While female masculinity might
constitute a certain transgenderism under that generous umbrella, transgender or man do
not really seem to constitute an identity for Jess. The language Jess uses to describe her
decision to transition indicates that it is a decision driven by the safety passing as a man
provides her, rather than one driven by identity. Moments when Jess describes feeling
that she is not a woman, or feeling like she is neither a man or a woman create the initial
sense that an internal-external discordance drives her desire to transition. This is
consistent with how transgenderism in its most legible form is generally conceptualized
today: to transition is to alleviate that discordance, to whatever degree is medically,
socially, and legally possible. However, other interjections suggest survival motivates her
to transition more than an internal need to externally satisfy or realize some identity that

8

Leslie Feinberg, Stone Butch Blues, (Los Angeles: Alyson Books, 1993). 145.
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is essential to her. This is indicated as Jess mulls over the possibility of manhood, telling
a group of friends, "I can't help thinking maybe I'd be safe, you know?"9 This language
is markedly different than feeling unlike a woman, and more indicative of someone who
needs to take shelter than of someone who will feel relieved by the form the shelter takes.
Although some forms of passing may be inadvertent or unwanted, passing is often
an intentional disappearing act so one can go safely unnoticed. Halberstam would
identify passing to disappear not as an act of retreat, but an act of resistance. Halberstam
calls this resistance of negation "shadow feminism," described as "a shadow archive of
resistance, one that does not speak in the language of action and momentum but instead
articulates itself in terms of evacuation, refusal, passivity, unbecoming, unbeing."10
Halberstam's insistence that negation "is not choosing between action and passivity,
freedom and death, but survival and desire"11 seems apt, articulating not only Jess'
sacrifice, but also her gain: she sacrifices lesbianism and any desires attached, but by
doing so, she makes it out of a dangerous present alive. If the choice is between survival
and desire, then Jess' sacrifice to survive does not meet Edelman's criteria for the death
drive, an embracement of desire at the expense of life. Jess expresses a roughly opposite
drive: an embracement of life at the expense of desire. Her ability to choose between

..
9

Ibid.

10

Judith Halberstam, "Shadow Feminisms: Queer Negativity and Radical

Passivity," in The Queer A rt ofFailure, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011). 129.
II

Ibid., 137.
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survival and desire is undennined by the severe imbalance of the options available, so she
picks survival and postpones desire.

t

Jess' decision to seek sanctuary by passing ultimately leads to her breakup with
Theresa, who is unable to reconcile the loss of a lesbian identity she holds tightly should
her girlfriend become her boyfriend. Jess asks her in a last effort to save their
relationship, "what if l don't take the honnones and pass?" Theresa responds, "then
you'll probably be killed on the street or take your own life out of madness, I don't
know." 1 2 It seems quietly understood throughout the text that butch lives are in danger,
but rarely is it so explicitly acknowledged. Jess' destiny as a butch dyke is her demise,
whether she is killed or driven to kill herself, and this is an unspoken agreement among
Jess' community of working class butches and femmes. She draws less attention to
herself as a man than as a butch, and if she hopes to arrive in a different and better future,
she needs to go unseen until she arrives in such a future. Edelman might scoff at this
exchange, but Jess eventually arrives in a future where she can revert back to butch dyke.
In an exchange among friends, Jess asks "does it just last for a little while? I mean
can you go back to being a butch later, when it's safe to come out?" 1 3 This dialogue again
points to passing as a temporary refuge until a safer social landscape presents itself.
Perhaps with hopes that her future will be created by other means, she contributes to a
different future in which it is possible to pursue gender transition as an act ofpositive
resistance, rather than an act of negative resistance driven by necessity to disappear. In

12

Feinberg, Stone Butch Blues, 145.

13

Ibid.
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other words, Jess' resistance of negation (Halberstam's shadow feminism) paves the way
for a future transgenderism that is positively pursued, visible, and named. Jess' journey is
non-linear and non-progressive, which challenges essential renderings of what it means to
be queer, and her movement between whatever space divides butch lesbianism and

,

transgenderism contributes to future queer possibilities. Her enactment of manhood is, at
best, an approximation, or what Butler calls mimicry. It is precisely this inevitable failure
to fully enact manhood-maleness-that is the stuff queer futures are made of. Negation
is very much affixed to queer in No Future, but Halberstam' s resistance of negation
dislodges queer negation from death, figuring it as one route to the future.

QUEER IDENTITY AND LINGUISTIC POSSIBILITY
Halberstam describes being confronted with resistance to the observation that
transmasculinity seems to grow out of butch, and I too find it to be a quickly and flatly
rejected argument that has to be delicately delivered. It is easily misinterpreted as a
reduction of butch lesbians to trans men in denial, and trans men to fonner or evolved
lesbians. This is indeed a reduction, but because concepts of transgender emerge and are
popularized at a particular moment following concepts of butch lesbianism, there seems
to be a time during which the closest approximation to transmasculinity and masculine
transsexuality is butch lesbianism. To insist otherwise is a projection of the self onto the
past-Benjamin's "time filled with the presence of now."14 The present retroactively
writes the past, so the past is never a time vacated and left untouched.

14

Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," 26 1 .
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In the case of transgender, the existence of transgender bodies and identities are
written into a history that would not recognize them. If it can be established that a certain
queer existence runs deep through history, that there is some precedent for us, it can be
claimed our queerness has always existed, and therefore must be real and true. Locating
ourselves in the past functions to combat religious and conservative rhetoric that

'

describes queerness as confusion, an illness, a perversion, or some sort of passing phase.

However, Halberstam asserts that, "the category of the transsexual emerged out of a very
different nexus of gender variance, embodiment, and sexual subjectivity," 15 indicating
that transsexuality is a concept that emerges in a particular time and place at the onset of
its possibility. Because dominant cultural understandings of transgender emphasize a
discordance of body and mind and efforts to correct that discordance, it is a queerness
bizarrely dependent on medicine. For this reason, the onset of possibility would seem to
correspond with its medical possibility. Without a recognized diagnosis of Gender
Identity Disorder and the availability of hormone replacement therapy and sex
corrective/gender-affirming surgeries, transgender is near-unimaginable.
As such, it is not particularly sensible or useful to apply "transgender" to refer to
seemingly similar deviations of sex and gender in a period before their linguistic
emergence, or otherwise become possible. One could argue that transgenderism has
always existed and was merely named, but what I mean to suggest is that the naming has
shaped a different categorization entirely, not at all present prior to a naming: a fork in

15

Halberstam, "Transgender Butch: Butch/FTM Border Wars and the Masculine

Continuum," 288.
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possibilities, not simply a new vocabulary for old possibilities. If there is nothing that
eventually culminates to transmasculinity, then it seems that transgenderism appeared
suddenly as it is, and only in the last half century or so with no traces of its prior
existence; this is a conceptualization of heterohistory. To trace transgender back in time
as ancestry or genealogy is to do homohistory-to eliminate false and rigid boundaries.
This opens up the space to imagine queer pasts building a queer present in which
transsexuality is both conceptualized and recognized as its own, solitary category
dislodged from sexuality, and where it is increasingly possible and acceptable to pursue
medical masculinization. Butches clear a path for female masculinity, and eventually a
path for female masculinity to more closely resemble not just manhood, but maleness.
Thresholds of norms of acceptability are rarely shattered in broad and significant ways,
but are rather slowly tested and provoked, the boundaries gently nudged out of place. The
unwillingness to entertain the possibility that trans men are a cultural outgrowth of butch
lesbianism makes it seem as if trans men appeared suddenly, doing the work of
heterohistory that places sharp barriers between time, people, and ideologies. Jess reveals
the false rigidity of the boundaries between butch and trans.
Perhaps a homohistorical assertion is that butch lesbians who do female
masculinity contribute to a future in which it is possible for women to be men. For
transgender people today, this is a meaningful mechanism. Though Jess' transition back
to butch lesbianism later in the text suggests that butch better constitutes what Jess really
is as far as identity is conceptualized as essential to the self, the tension she expresses

between butch lesbianism and a non-woman identity make it difficult to ascertain
whether she can better be reduced to butch dyke or trans man. Ultimately, it is moot, and
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making sense of her changing queerness requires reimagining queer as far more
malleable than essential. Essential to the self is only one way to make sense of queerness,
and it is a relatively new (and currently dominant) way to conceptualize it. How "born
that way" became the dominant narrative should be obvious, as it better justifies queer
rights than if queer is only a matter of misbehavior. In Histo,y ofSexuality, philosopher
Michel Foucault describes a juridical divide in which the nature of queer punishment
changes at the onset of modern psychiatry, coinciding more or less with the dawn of the
modern era. Psychiatry's coinage of "homosexuality" circa 1869 caused a linguistic shift
making it possible to declare that one is a homosexual, instead of merely that they do
something against sexual mores. Before this shift, according to Foucault, sexual deviance
was punished on a basis of actions-actually committing sodomy or buggery. Modern
psychiatry implemented additional or supportive punishment on a basis of something
more essential and intrinsic-what we might say evolved into queer identity, but
specifically figured as pre-determined, or born. It is this conceptualization that makes it
tempting to speculate as to what Jess really is.
Queer theorist David Halperin argues that Foucault's juridical distinction has
since been misinterpreted to mean that there was no sense of queer identity until modern
psychiatry. Insisting this is a mistake, Halperin says, "[i]t is not an empirical claim about

the historical existence or nonexistence of sexually deviant individuals " (no emphasis
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added). 1 6 On Halperin's clarification, Carla Freccero, scholar of Literature, History, and
Women's Studies, says:

"Forgetting Foucault" is an essay ... that admonishes the tendency in histories of
sexuality to reduce Foucault's discussion of the nineteenth-century "invention" of
the homosexual to the declaration that premodernity defined sex acts juridically,
whereas modernity ascribes to the individual something called a sexuality, an
identity or orientation that is sexually defined and that, when examined, is thought
to reveal the truth of the individual. 1 7

Freccero agrees with Halperin that Foucault's distinction is juridical, but she seems to
disagree that it is a mistake to employ it as evidence against a premodern concept of
queer identity. Her assertion that a shift toward an essentialism we might think of as
identity indeed occurred with the invention of homosexuality goes like this:
"[h]omosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from
the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphroditism of the soul.

16

David Halperin, "Forgetting Foucault: Acts, Identities, and the History of

Sexuality," in Representalions, no. 63. 8. ( 1 998): 99.
17

Carla Freccero, "Undoing the History of Homosexuality," in

Queer/Early/Modern, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). 32.
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The sodomite was a temporary aberration; the homosexual is now a species." 1 8

19

Rhetoric around transgender identity that attributes transgenderism to a biological
mistake suggests that a similar speciation has occurred in the construction of transgender,
and speciation is not a far leap from diagnosis. This speciation both of homosexuality and
transgender make Jess seem anomalous, even among queers, in her ability to occupy
seemingly quite different versions of queerness, interrupting neoliberal narratives around
the nature of queer identity as essential.
Freccero's essay, "Undoing the History of Homosexuality," is presumably a riff
off of Halperin's "How to Do the History of Male Homosexuality." In that essay,
Halperin employs a similar argument as in "Forgetting Foucault," asserting that versions
of identity have been formulated on the basis of same-sex object-choice across time. He
lists four externalized or observable items of the premodern era that were thought to
indicate something essential about the self: effeminacy, pederasty, friendship, and
inversion. 20 Halperin seems sure something resembling identity existed in the premodern
era. However, the identities he describes are more imposed from outside the self on the
basis of the observable characteristics listed, something more akin to diagnosis than
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identity. The imposition is what the external is thought to mean about the internal.
Conversely, Freccero seems to be describing identities that are not imposed, but self
assumed, which I interpret to be an internalization of externally observable criteria as
essential. This difference suggests a linguistic shift enabled by the coinage of
homosexuality (from do to is) facilitates an internalization of essentialism. At the risk of
drawing a heterohistorical line, this would position identity of the premodern era as
imposed, and identity of the modern/postmodern eras as assumed, shifting approximately
at the institutionalized diagnosis/invention of homosexuality around 1869. In the mid
twentieth century, Jess occupies a period of time in between this linguistic possibility and
what I interpret to be a growing emphasis on an ever-more-granular identitarian
taxonomy within queer culture today. Queer identity is figured as essential and born
today, making it difficult to understand Jess' movement between different versions of
queerness.
Since the coinage of homosexuality- the declaration that one is-is a coinage of
psychiatry, efforts to correct and cure it rather than simply to punish its enaction follow
its coinage. No longer a need to actually enact anything to earn a punishment, the
suspicion that one might just want it amounts to the suspicion that one might be it, and
this is enough to intervene. Literary critic Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick says that inherent in
this effort is "the wish that gay people 1101 exist, "21 an effort toward a more pure, less
queer future. Such ideologies have become quite fringe in the medical community, and
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major medical associations no longer endorse the treatment of homosexuality, but
remnants of the diagnosis that once justified treatment persist in conceptualization of
identity that, like psychiatry, figures homosexuality as a matter of is. Queer identity,
figured as essential, born, and intrinsic, takes the side of diagnostic homosexuality that is
psychological, biological, and even genetic or hereditary. An uncomfortable consequence
of this conceptualization is the way it creates opportunity for necropolitical-eugenic
motivations. Though desire and identity are similarly internal understandings of the
self.- as opposed to action, which is externalized and observable-Freccero's shift to
desire over identity avoids the essentialism identity shares with medicine. Perhaps it also
alleviates the dependence of transgender on medicine as a means to correct what is
described as a biological mistake.
Though Freccero works within an arguably heterohistorical dichotomy, she does
not work within the dichotomy of do and is (action and identity) that makes up the
Foucaultian divide which Halperin insists is purely juridical. The assertion that queer is
about what one does, rather than what one is, has the potential to support Edelman's
contention that queerness is antithetical to the Child, and therefore to children, by
suggesting that children cannot be queer because they (arguably) seldom act on it.
Instead, Freccero works in a dichotomy of is and want (identity and desire). Desire is not
an action or matter of do itself, but may of course be acted on; identity remains a matter
of the essential is. Freccero's shift from action to desire alleviates the suggestion that
children are not queer. It also alleviates similar implications we cease to be queer in
periods of sexual abstinence, that queer requires a certain physical capacity to do, and
that queerness does not encompass asexuality, a queerness of void: not of what we do,
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but what we do not do. Munoz says, "queerness is . . . in many crucial ways formless,"22
which is precisely what makes it futuristic. Its amorphousness makes it possible to project
hopes and dreams onto it and to realize them through queerness' malleability. Identity
renders queer more static than possible, however many sub-categories of identity we
generate to reflect queer's hallmark formlessness.
This tension between identity and desire also appears in Menon's theory of
homohistory, as Menon names desire homohistorical, but names sexual identity
heterohistorical. This indicates that the ever-more-granular identitarian taxonomy within
queer culture is a project of heterohistory. The development of seemingly both endless
and trivial terminology to describe queer identity as an essential truth of the self appears,
at first glance, to be a practice of justice in the form of legibility. In other words,
identitarian taxonomy seems to be how we are trying to fix the problem of our possibility
by giving language to what previously had none. However, I am concerned that the
framework of identity, and the categories which follow, only seem endlessly open to
possibility because of their seemingly endless granularity. Munoz believes that if
queerness "is to have any political resonance," it "needs to be more than an identitarian
marker and to articulate a forward-dawning futurity."23 Though Munoz does not
necessarily situate identitarian markers at odds with futurity, the suggestion seems to
occupy the negative space, in which case it is a feeling that I share. Further, because
queer identity is figured as serious and essential, desire and pleasure are consequently
relegated to the realm of frivolity. Frivolity is Edelman's territory wherein the future is
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both inherently contradictory to desire and pleasure, and actively rejected via pursuit of
them.
Edelman's No Future begins with a figure comprised of Freud's death drive and
Lacan's sinthome. The death drive describes a human drive toward death and self
destruction; the sinthome is a subject experiencing jouissance, a French term employed
by Lacan that translates roughly to "enjoyment," but bears a suggestion of sexual
pleasure that does not survive the translation. Edelman's queer conglomerate
sinthomosexual, then, is a figure whose selfish pursuit of pleasure situates it as against
the future, against life, and against the pragmatism that sustains them. He describes the
sinthomosexual as having:

the privilege of refusing the responsibilities that come with collective life, the
privilege, that is, of sexual license, political disengagement, and thus, most
important, the privilege of remaining indifferent to the vulnerabilities of
others. . . [t]he sinthomosexual...gets denounced for affirming a jouissance
indulgently fixed on the self, while those who merit recognition as good, as
communally minded, as properly social, address the suffering of the other for
which the Child is our dominant trope.24

24

Lee Edelman, "Ever After," in After Sex?, ed. Janet Halley and Andrew Parker

(Durham: Duke University Press, 201 1), 1 1 6.

Minadeo 25
Pleasure is well-affixed to queerness precisely because the non-procreativity narrative
necessarily figures queer sex as purely for pleasure by virtue of its non-procreative
potential. Queer sex has no greater purpose than pleasure. Pleasure is exactly contrary to
responsibility in No Fl/lure, and because queers never assume the responsibility for the
future through pregnancy, birth, and parenthood, they remain in a sort of suspended
childhood free of responsibility. Queer is in the realm of pleasure, but death is the trade
off; heterosexuality is in the realm of responsibility, but life is the reward. However,
another literary figure suggests that pleasure and life are not mutually exclusive, but that
queer pursuit of pleasure is what mobilizes queers toward the future.

THE ROARING GIRL AND RESISTANCE TO EXISTENTIAL DENIAL

Moll Cutpurse of The Roaring Girl is a gender-bending pick-pocket in
seventeenth century London, based on the real Mary Frith. Some century and a half
before the coinage of homosexuality, Moll enacts queerness as positive resistance. Moll
is repeatedly described as a monster in the text, and this descriptor is linked with no
uncertainty to her transgressive gender. The refusal to recognize the existence or reality
of certain bodies is an effective oppressive tactic, and another way to describe this refusal
is to deny their possibility. This interpellation functions as a form of gas-lighting in
which a subject faces the insistence of a different truth than what the subject understands
to be true until they internalize it so much as to believe it. A form of gas-lighting, this is
designed to cause queers to question the validity or reality of their queerness in order to
inspire at least one of two doubts in queer minds: the possibility that their own queerness
is false or the possibility that their own existence does not actually resemble human
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existence, if not both. In other words, it suggests the possibility that they are impossible.
Both doubts may be effectively oppressive enough to cause queers to self-select out of
the dominant culture, or even out of life itself. This is precisely the purpose of naming
Moll's queerness a monstrosity: to drive her away and out of sight by all means
necessary. Queers often end up dead or maimed in literature and life alike. Were The

Roaring Girl a different genre and Moll a less resilient figure, it is not a stretch to
imagine the play ending instead with a monster conquered. 25
Suicidality butts into the death drive here, but it would not be fair to substitute
being death-driven for being suicidal; the death drive is marked by an experience of
pleasure, while suicidality is marked by a void of it. The violence historically wielded
onto queer bodies as a means of persecution and correction are very real threats to
futurity that quite literally end queer lives. The inspiration of suicidality in queers is one
removed mechanism to accomplish their deaths. The father of Moll's sham fiance, Sir
Alexander, pursues an indirect attack on Moll's life, but one Butler would nonetheless
characterize as "not only a means of social control but a form of dehumanizing
violence."26 To foil what he believes to be a legitimate marriage arrangement between
Moll and Sebastian, Sir Alexander plots Moll's public humiliation.
The plan to humiliate Moll involves framing her with marked currency to later be
identified as stolen, and with these he says, "will I make induction to her ruin, and rid
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shame from my house, grief from my heart. "27 While his plan to trap Moll in her own
craft of thievery and have her arrested takes advantage of her criminal transgressions, it is
Moll's violations of gender that ultimately fuel his desires to humiliate her. This may
additionally serve the purpose of embarrassing his son so much as to convince him the
marriage is undesirable, but it is his desire to punish Moll by causing her to internalize
the possibility that she is not real by any human standards that is the dehumanizing
violence described by Butler. It seems that he intends to inspire what Butler calls a
"pervasive sense of [her] own unreality,"28 using humiliation to reveal and instill her
unreality to herself. Butler goes on to say that this internalized unreality can morph into
suicidality,29 and this is a queer feeling that can be sti11 be located today as queers take
their own lives in a world they presumably find uninhabitable. It also appears in Stone

Butch Blues when Jess' destiny appears to be either murder or suicide. One way to
interpret this is to say that existential doubt has the effect of indirectly killing queers by
guiding their hands, and the inspiration of self-doubt and suicidality may very well be the
overarching oppressive purpose of such a tactic.
Repeated reference to Moll as something inhuman, mythical even, further serves
to deny her existence. When Sir Alexander-the father of Mo11's sham fiancee,
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Sebastian· -poses the pointed question, "[w] hat, will he marry a monster with two
trinkets,"30 he makes clear that it is Moll's gendered transgression that calls her
humanness into question. The implication in his question is that any answer in the
affirmative is perfectly absurd. Gender, sex, and even same-sex desire are not particularly
distinct in seventeenth century Europe,3 1 as is somewhat evident in how they seem
conflated to a modem ear throughout the text. Queer, like anything else, must be
considered in its spatial and temporal context. In translations of Lacan, "j ouissance"
remains untranslated because no English word accurately captures both its denotative and
connotative meanings, and a similar disservice happens when language is used outside of
its temporal context. As such, there is no meaningful way to understand Moll in her
spatial and temporal location as simply a social deviant. The implication in Sir
Alexander's sexed accusation, which he presumably forms on a gendered basis in a
modem reading, is that it is only humanly possible to be either male or female; there is no
social deviation from this that is not in some way also conceptualized as a deviation from
biological sex. Moll straddles some line between woman- and manhood, and because of
what this border is thought to mean about the body, the in-between Moll occupies brands
her an anomaly or a sideshow attraction-something impossible yet embodied and
standing before us.
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Butler says "[i]t is the inhuman, the beyond the human, the less than human, the
border that secures the human in its ostensible reality."32 Exceptional, anomalous genders
and bodies like Moll's serve to justify the realness and reify the normalcy of normative
genders and bodies. However, Butler says they also stretch the boundaries of what is
possible, explaining that it is "appropriation of the terms of domination that turns them
toward a more enabling future. "33 It is precisely the failure of queers to adequately
appropriate those terms of domination that reifies them as the norm. What Butler suggests
is when queers inevitably and necessarily fail to convincingly mimic normal genders and
bodies, a fracture forms wherein social transformation occurs. For Edelman, negation is
on the side of death and past, but Butler's imagination of the formation of possibility out
of failure redirects negation toward future instead of away from it.
For all his efforts, there is nothing in the text that would suggest that Moll
internalizes the existential doubt Sir Alexander imposes on her to any meaningful degree.
Never when she faces an insult does she hang her head in shame; rather, she tends to fire
back unapologetically in a way that does not rely on out-insulting an opponent but
elevates her. For instance, she exclaims that Sir Alexander "[s]hould be proud of such a
daughter: As good a man, as your son!"34 In the same exchange, she says, "[y]ou do not
know the benefits I bring with me: No cheat dares work upon you, with thumb or knife,

Butler, "Social Transformation," 2 1 8.
33

Judith Butler, "Gender is Burning: Questions of Appropriation and Subversion,"

in Bodies that Matter, (New York: Routledge, 1 993), 1 37.
34

,---

Middleton and Dekker, "The Roaring Girl," 304.

Minadeo 30
While you've a roaring girl to your son's wife."35 Moll navigates a public world
perfonning a transgressive gender but does so with an unapologetic confidence that she
uses to fend off attempts to insult her and deny her humanity. However, gender is not
Moll's only transgression. The society in which she violates gender norms is a world she
rejects in favor of one divorced from the laws of decency and respectability.
Moll's working and criminal classes grant her freedoms a middle or noble class
cannot. Any power imbued in Sir Alexander's attempted humiliation wilts when Moll
fails to internalize her inhumanity as an essential truth-the accusation that a monster is
what she is- thereby rendering her a possibility. The success of Sir Alexander's attempt
to render Moll a crude sideshow depends on whether she internalizes gender as a binary
and herself as inhuman. Her ability to resist this is supported by her underclass context
that supports bent and broken rules. By maintaining such confidence in her queerness and
its unseen advantages, she effectively broadens gendered possibilities, and it is
possibilities that make up the future she carves out for herself that existential doubt is
meant to withhold from queers. She does this even as she rejects responsibility that is
opposed to future in No Future. A pickpocket, Moll is already a somewhat of a pariah,
and she lives by a different set of rules. Lack of recognized rules defines her class, and its
embracement of infonnal rules directly contradicts those designed to maintain the
dominant social order. Not only is she unconstrained by demands of womanhood like
marriage and subordination, but also unconstrained by the responsibility to uphold a
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familial reputation demanded by a class like Sebastian's, whose marriage to Moll is

�

objectionable at least somewhat because it threatens family reputation. These are the sort
of responsibilities queers may be free from should they accept Edelman's challenge. Moll
seems to be both rejecting responsibility and experiencing pleasure, but she constitutes
the queer suspended childhood without necessarily constituting the death drive.
Butler raises questions around who is entitled to ..the good life, "36 a question of
necropolitics. Despite attempts to dehumanize her, Moll seems certain her queerness
offers her a good life that a normative one simply cannot. Without the responsibilities or
possibilities of marriage or children, queers have enjoyed the freedom to prioritize
pleasure first and foremost, something Edelman hopes to hang onto. While Edelman fails
to entertain the possibility that there are ways to contribute to the future that do not take
the form of children, Butler hints at queer futurity through a discussion of existential
possibility. Future hinges on the chance to be possible, to not have humanity or reality
denied, but Moll is not waiting for possibility to be granted to her. She declares,"! please
myself, and care not else who loves me,"37 a declaration suited for Edelman's
individualistic call for queers to pursue their desires, and arguably evident of "the
privilege of remaining indifferent to the vulnerabilities of others. "3s However, the
pleasure that Moll lays claim to in the present is not situated at odds with the future-any
effort to deny Moll her future is her impetus to exist. For Edelman, it is either laboring
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now for the future later, or pleasure now with no future to speak of. Quite contrary, it is
Moll's entitlement to pleasure that creates her future and builds other possibilities of
queer futures. Butler says, "[t]he thought of a possible life is only an indulgence for those
who already know themselves to be possible. For those who are still looking to become
possible, possibility is a necessity."39 Jess forgoes her desire in exchange to live a little
longer in hopes that a different future is not too far off, while Moll exists now without
having to sacrifice desire. Moll seems to be a figure who embodies Edelman's hedonism,
while her recognizability in queerness today contradicts his contention that pleasure goes
against the grain of the future. A possibility is necessarily futuristic, and Moll's
embodiment of what seems impossible in the present establishes a possibility that she
or future queer manifestations of her-will continue to be possible.
It is so undesirable to visibly inhabit a non-normative body in this world that
people like Moll may simply disappear instead, as Jess does, thereby remaining unusual.
Butler asserts such non-normative ways of being "have not been admitted in to the terms
that govern within reality,''4° and this is in large part because they are so thoroughly
discouraged, suppressed, and killed through denial of existence and humanity. But Moll
lives with no regard for the terms that govern reality, and it is this that allows her to exist
anyway by enacting her gender and pursuing her pleasures, thereby establishing a queer
existence and a queer possibility to exist in the future. Insofar as subjectivity hinges on
recognition, highly visible queerness like Moll's has an urgent power to transform. While
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there may be a certain romanticized heroism in dying before living at the expense of
desires, an authenticity Edelman seems willing to die for, someone must resist by living
life if it is ever going to be possible to live without the constant threat of death. Jess and
Moll are both nudging queer possibilities into being through different modes of
resistance. Jess refuses to accept that there is no future, only that there is no present. The
truth is that Jess' future really does only exist in the future, while men have always had a
present, so she seeks to live convincingly as a man so that she may too. Moll disregards
the denial of her life and lives unapologetically now. I want to imagine that Moll and Jess
facilitate the future possibilities being realized in the present and constitute this as a
meaningful and uniquely queer contribution to future. Like how versions of
transgenderism might emerge from butches like Jess, perhaps versions of female
masculinity like butch emerge from the likes of Moll. The possibility that Jess may return
to her butch roots in a safer future is a rather optimistic outlook, an unlikely outlook on
Edelman's part.
Though even Edelman might agree that Jess' disappearance into the dominant
landscape constitutes action, as "the void can never appear as itself in the fonn of pure
negativity,"41 it is unlikely he would file this under death-driven negativity, and I would
not either. Choosing survival over desire should indicate that first and foremost, as
Edelman's death drive prioritizes desire at the expense of life. Instead of accepting and
reveling in this destiny, Jess forgoes certain lesbian desires, approximating freedom while
surviving with hopes for a fuller freedom in a future more prepared for her existence. As
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Butler would say, the problem is Jess is not yet possible, and in a world of her
impossibility, her choices are disappearing into something possible (like manhood) or
death. Jess' picks disappearance, only to reemerge in an era wherein she finds herself
more possible. This is an inversion of Moll, yet Jess still appears to represent some
creation of possibility. Moll takes the risk of active and visible queerness. Moll's life is
still in danger, perhaps to a greater degree than Jess' because of her unabashed visibility
and disinterest in passing, but while she risks her life, she provokes new possibilities by
claiming hers. Moll's resistance to the denial of her queer existence is enabled by the
unique freedoms of her criminal class, and as she claims her queer existence, humanity,
and reality, she effectively makes herself possible.

ACCUMULATION

Possibility is necessarily futuristic. Butler figures survival as a matter of what is
possible: "[t]he thought of a possible life is only an indulgence for those who already
know themselves to be possible. For those who are still looking to become possible,
possibility is a necessity."42 Whether we are possible is a question of subjectivity directly
linked to the necropolitical question of "[w]hose life is counted as life,"'0 which might be
answered more efficiently by first identifying whose life is not marked for death in some
direct or indirect way. Among criticisms of No Future is Edelman's failure to evaluate
exactly who might be guaranteed future, granted possibility, or withheld both. As Munoz
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explains, Edelman's life, as a white gay man, is already more or less counted as life. He
is already possible, and will presumably remain possible, so he has the luxury of rejecting
a future that is already guaranteed to him. Rejecting it is an exercise an entitlement. In
other words, Edelman has been conferred some permission to exist in the form-albeit
queer-he takes that is white and male. He is onto something in his contention that
queers have no future, but it is not because they fail to replicate themselves into the future
through reproduction, only that queers are not unquestionably awarded possibility.
Deciding what queer is about, and by extension, on what basis queer might be
possible is contentious and political, but it requires that we validate queerness
nonetheless whether it is possible on a basis of identity (is), action (do), or desire (want).
Queer future may hinge on the concession that queer is possible, on whatever basis it is
possible, though I find that identitarian bases cannot provide the ample room queer really
occupies and benefits from.
Queers have not always existed in terms recognizable today, but something
interpretable as queer always has existed. Instead of replicating itself into the future
through reproduction, the queer future is in approximations and failures. The nature of
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) makes a fine metaphor for the queer failures
that seem to compel new ways to be queer and, as I have attempted to demonstrate, seem
temporally mappable. HIV is a rapidly mutating virus, meaning it makes many copies of
itself very quickly, each copy a slightly imperfect version of the last. This is confusing to
an immune system trying to mobilize an immune response, but these mutations occur at a
predictable rate, making it possible to follow the path of the virus from body to body. It is
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in imperfect copies, Butler's failures to reproduce norms, that queer carves paths to its
own possibilities.
For Edelman, pleasure is a balm for the affliction of a present. Pleasure and death
are conspiring for Edelman, but not so for Munoz. Munoz supposes that while pleasure
might be a balm, the queer drive toward pleasure also mobilizes us out of an imperfect
present and toward a more perfect future. His rebuttal to No Future-a theory which, like
me, Munoz finds simultaneously brilliant and troubling-is to suggest we imagine queer
as a horizon. The horizon recedes as it is approached, always out of reach. So, too, does
the future, folding seamlessly into the present and getting rolled up in the past before it
can be arrived at. Horizons are unreachable because they are imaginary, making it apt for
the imagination it takes to ensure queer lives. Not only does queer have a future, but
queer is futuristic in and of itself. Munoz says the horizon "rescues and emboldens
concepts such as freedom that have been withered by the touch of neoliberal thought and
gay assimilationist politics."44 While he admits the naivety of utopian aspirations, he also
stands firmly by them, firing back that it is the constraining pragmatism of neoliberal
politics "that present themselves as rational and ultimately more doable"45 that figures
utopian aspirations as unrealistic. Perhaps utopianism is yet another horizon: something
we may pursue but might do well to suspend any expectation to achieve. Queer's lack of
finality makes it a site unlimited and changing possibility, and its amorphousness makes
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the pursuit of the future more life-giving than an essential basis of possibility. Edelman
does not see queer for all the opportunity it is imbued with, but how we conceptualize the
future and its possibilities sets the standard for quality of the future for queers. Imagining
queer as a site of possibility instead of a site of death is precisely the difference between
granting entry to a future and withholding it.
While in the early stages of this research, a friend experienced a tremendous
amount of loss within her extended queer community over a short period of time. Several
took their own lives. Several others disappeared, their bodies later found maimed and
lifeless in alleyways with other disposables. She was approaching 40, and at a time when
news of queer death was frequent, some evidence of queer survival became crucial to her
own survival. She had no example of what it looked like to be a queer at 40. What
troubled her was queer futures. Seeking friendships with older queers became how she
coped with the enormous uncertainty of queer life, how she reassured herself that queers
do make it. The past informs and explains the present, and it reassures us that there is, to
borrow from poet Buddy Wakefield, "life after survival."46 It is important that we see the
future as something that can be built, something we can touch, rearrange, and effect, so a
future where queer deaths are precedent and imminent may be replaced with the world of
our wildest dreams.
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